Quality policy, market structure and investment behavior in the food marketing chain by Hoffmann, Ruben
Quality Policy,
Market Structure and Investment Behavior
in the Food Marketing Chain
RubenHoffmann
Faculty of Natural Resources and Agricultural Sciences
Department of Economics,
Uppsala
Doctoral Thesis
Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences
Uppsala 2006Acta Universitatis Agriculturae Sueciae
2006:42
ISSN, 1652-6880
ISBN, 91-576-7091-9
c  2006 Ruben Hoffmann, Uppsala
Tryck: SLU Service/Repro, Uppsala 2006Abstract
Ruben Hoffmann. Quality Policy, Market Structure and Investment Behavior in the
Food Marketing Chain. Doctoral Thesis.
ISSN, 1652-6880, ISBN, 91-576-7091-9.
This thesis, consisting of four articles, analyzes quality in relation to consumer de-
mand and market structure, and the potential problem of asset ﬁxity at primary level.
All four articles, directly or indirectly, relate to different parts of the food marketing
chain. Article I examines country of origin as a quality cue from a consumer per-
ception perspective. This is an empirical article applied to the market for fresh meat
in Sweden where the characteristics of consumers are related to how important they
perceive the labelling ”Swedish” to be in evaluating (i) the eating quality and (ii)
the food safety of pork, beef and chicken.
Article II examines how ownership structure affects the equilibrium within a
two-stage duopoly framework where ﬁrms ﬁrst choose what qualities to produce
and then compete in prices. Speciﬁcally, cooperatives and investor-owned ﬁrms
are analyzed. It is shown that ﬁrms can have a structural cost advantage due to
ownership structure in addition to the high-quality advantage identiﬁed in previous
literature. The equilibrium outcomes are examined and the policy implications of
the different structures are discussed.
In a multi-product oligopoly framework article III examines what qualities ﬁrms
choose to produce and the conditions for when ﬁrms choose specialization versus
head-to-head competition. The conditions for symmetric and asymmetric equilibria
are identiﬁed and discussed. It is shown that head-to-head competition rather than
specialization is a common outcome and that holes may be left in the product line.
Finally, article IV examines the impact of uncertainty on investment behavior in
the U.S. hog production using an endogenous threshold model. The results indicate
that the investment behavior is characterized by three regimes (investment, disin-
vestment and inaction) and thus yield support for asset ﬁxity in sow investments.
The importance of accounting for investment rigidity when estimating hog supply
and variable input demands is highlighted. While quality is not explicitly modelled
in article IV, the potential problem of asset ﬁxity examined has implications for
quality policy.
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Articles I–IV1 Introduction
There are two observations pertaining to the food industry that have driven much of
the research presented in this thesis. The ﬁrst observation is that there has been an
increased focus on quality and that quality assurance schemes have become increas-
ingly common over the years. The other observation is that vertically integrated
cooperatives are common in many agricultural markets, and that cooperatives in
these markets often compete with investor-owned ﬁrms. These observations relate
to the Swedish food industry as well as the food industry in many other countries.
Theincreasedfocusonfoodqualityinrecentyearscanbeexplainedbychanging
consumer preferences, negative publicity concerning food safety and food quality,
and increased international competition as a result of deregulation. Faced with the
problems of, for example salmonella, BSE (mad cow disease), e-coli, different qual-
ity assurance schemes have been implemented. Some of these have been initiated
by the industry, some by the government, some by third parties and some in collab-
oration between different parties. While some of these quality assurance schemes
are exclusively for internal use, the food marketing chain has also developed sev-
eral quality assurance schemes and private labels to be communicated to consumers
(e.g., Northen, 2000). By developing quality assurance schemes and requiring sup-
pliers to implement these, companies downstream are able to control the quality of
the ﬁnal product and ultimately to gain consumer trust, and potentially an increase
in market shares and proﬁts.
The globalization has substantially inﬂuenced quality policy. In the interest of
free trade the roles of national regulations have been circumscribed. Different coun-
tries, or groups of countries, represent different views on what food quality and
food safety really constitutes. For example, the EU and the U.S. represent different
views concerning the use of hormones in meat production and concerning geneti-
cally modiﬁed products (see e.g., Sheldon, 2002; Fulton and Giannakas, 2004; Lusk
et al., 2003; Alfnes and Rickertsen, 2003). Given the institutional framework of the
WTO, such different views can naturally lead to that a more liberal, exporting coun-
try accuses a more restrictive, importing country of protectionism.
Within the EU, regulations pertaining to the internal market state that goods
should be allowed to move freely between member states.1 Hence, national regu-
lations that may be considered to be trade barriers have to be approved by the EU
by exemption. While individual member countries may impose regulations concern-
ing the domestic production practices, they have generally no right to ban imports
from other EU member states produced according to the national regulations in the
exporting countries. Hence, the role of national regulations by member states has
been circumscribed which increases the importance of quality assurance schemes
implemented by the industry or by third parties.
The increased focus on quality in the food marketing chain has resulted in
an increased need for vertical integration and other forms of vertical coordina-
tion.MenardandKlein(2004), examiningtheorganizationalstructureoftheEUand
1 See especially Articles 28-30 of the EC Treaty available at
http : //europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/regulation/goods/art2830en.htm.
11the U.S. agricultural sectors, emphasize the importance of network organizations in
agricultural markets. Network organizations constitute a compromise between the
beneﬁts of centralized control and the beneﬁts of decentralized decision making
with respect to incentives and information, relying on relational contracts rather
than only formal written agreements. One traditional kind of network organizations,
common in the agricultural sector in many countries, is producer cooperatives.2 The
aim of an agricultural cooperative is to assist the members/farmers in producing and
marketing their output.3 While cooperatives dominate some markets they usually
compete with investor-owned ﬁrms. The market share of the cooperatives naturally
differs between countries and sectors. Within the EU-15, the market shares of the
agricultural cooperatives are substantial in many markets. For example, dairy coop-
eratives are present in all 15 countries and have a market share of 80% or more in
nine of these countries. While cooperatives are less dominating concerning meats
and cereals, cooperatives have a market share of at least 50% in six of the countries
for each of the product groups4.(Van Bekkum et al., 1997; Juliá and Server, 2003)
In the U.S. there were more than 3,000 agricultural cooperatives, half of which were
marketing cooperatives, accounting for 25– 30% of total farm marketing and supply
expenditures in 2001 (Giannakas and Fulton, 2005; USDA, 2003).
Giventheeffectsthatglobalizationofthefoodmarketandtheincreasedfocuson
quality have on consumer demand it is important to understand quality policy from
a consumer perspective. Furthermore, it is well-known that the organizational struc-
ture of ﬁrms operating in the same market is crucial for the market outcome. Given
the coexistence of ﬁrms with different structures in many agricultural markets, it
is important to better understand how the market outcome is affected by different
organizational structures when quality policy is taken into account. Furthermore,
Loyd et al. (2001) have shown that the magnitude of price shifts due to food scares
may be greater further up-stream the marketing chain, i.e. that the change in input
prices is larger than the change in output prices.
This thesis analyzes quality in relation to consumer demand and market struc-
ture. Furthermore, the potential problem of asset ﬁxity at primary level is examined.
An overview of the articles in this thesis is given in table 1. All four articles, directly
or indirectly, relate to the food marketing chain. Speciﬁcally, article I and article IV,
which are of empirical nature, directly relate to the meat marketing chain while arti-
cle II and article III may be related to the meat marketing chain although they are of
a more general theoretical nature. The articles cover different parts of the marketing
chain. Article I examines the consumer side of the market, article II and III exam-
ines the primary and secondary level of the marketing chain using a game theoretic
approach, and article IV analyzes the primary level.
2 In Sweden the ﬁrst farm cooperative was formed as early as 1850 (van Boekel et al., 1997).
3 There exist many different kinds of cooperatives but they can they be said to be either marketing
cooperative, buying the output generated by the members and marketing the goods to ﬁrms/customers
downstream the marketing chain, or supply cooperatives, supplying inputs required by the members, or
a combination of the two. Whenever cooperatives are mentioned in this thesis it ﬁrst and foremost refers
to marketing cooperatives.
4 For at least one kind of meat.
12Table 1: Overview of the articles
Articles
I II III IV
Nature of article - empirical x x
- theoretical x x
Level of the marketing chain
- primary level x x x
- secondary level x x
- consumer level x
Heterogeneity - producers x x
- consumers x x x
- products (quality) x x x a)
Strategic interactions, game theory x x
Institutional aspects, industrial structure b) x x
Uncertainty xc) x
Cost structure - ﬁxed x xd)
- variable, CRS x x
- variable, DRS x x x
a) While not explicitly modelled the result has implications for quality policy as discussed in the text.
b) The
institutional aspect is only considered in the respect that the regulatory framework is essential for the article.
c) The
type of product characteristics considered are primarily of such nature that consumers have to rely on quality assurance
schemes in order to obtain the relevant information.
d) Focuses on quasi-ﬁxed inputs.
Articles I-III are all concerned with some aspect of quality as shown in table
1. While quality is not explicitly modelled in article IV, the conclusion that produc-
ers seem to sometimes adjust slower than the market conditions warrant has impli-
cations for quality policy. If uncertainty in ”traditional” production implies asset
ﬁxity then, the adoption of new quality assurance schemes may imply a slow adjust-
ment to new production practices as these may be perceived as entailing additional
uncertainty. On the other hand, a quality assurance scheme may be perceived as a
possibility of targeting a niche of the market, i.e. a small but higher priced market
segment, in which case it would reduce the perceived uncertainty. Hendrikse and
Bijman (2001) argue that increased vertical coordination may increase asset ﬁxity
as investments become more relationship speciﬁc. Given that the increased focus on
quality result in an increased need for vertical coordination, the focus on quality is
likely to increase asset ﬁxity.
Article I examines country of origin as a quality cue from a consumer percep-
tion perspective. This is an empirical article applied to the market for fresh meat
in Sweden where the characteristics of consumers are related to how they perceive
the labelling of country of origin. The size of the meat marketing chain5 and the
5 The meat consumption in Sweden as well as in the EU is substantial and increasing over time. Meat
13inherent types of characteristics undetectable to the individual consumer, such as
animal welfare concerns, makes it an interesting industry to study from a quality
policy perspective.
Article II examines how the ownership structure of competing ﬁrms affect what
qualities ﬁrms choose to produce, how much of each quality they produce, what
prices they charge and how the welfare of producers and consumers are affected
by ownership structure. Speciﬁcally, vertically integrated marketing cooperatives
and investor-owned processing ﬁrms are analyzed within a game theoretic frame-
work. Furthermore, the choice of product lines and the effects of entry are discussed.
Inamulti-productoligopolyframework, articleIIIexamineswhatqualitiesﬁrms
choose to produce and the conditions for when ﬁrms choose specialization versus
head-to-head competition given that ﬁrms may be either vertically integrated or
vertically separated between the primary and the secondary levels of the marketing
chain.
Article IV examines the impact of uncertainty on investment behavior in the
U.S. hog industry using an endogenous threshold model. The U.S. hog production
has been characterized by a considerable structural change from smaller to larger
scale operations in the last decade.6 This drastic change can partly be explained
by increased access to international markets and various forms of vertical arrange-
ments. The structural change has naturally required greater amounts and more spe-
cialized types of capital, thus potentially increasing the problem of asset ﬁxity.
In the next section some theoretical background is presented. First, a brief gen-
eral introduction concerning quality and product differentiation is given in section
2.1. This is followed, in section 2.2, by a discussion concerning quality from a con-
sumer perspective. In section 2.3 game theory and vertical product differentiation is
discussed. The background to and the conclusions of article I is discussed in section
3. Article II and article III are discussed and the conclusions and contributions of
each of the articles are presented in section 4 and 5, respectively. This is followed by
a presentation of article IV in section 6. In section 7, some ideas for future research
are discussed.
2 ProductDifferentiation, QualityCuesandGame
Theory
2.1 Product Differentiation
Most products can be described as consisting of a bundle of characteristics. These
characteristics may be quality aspects, location, availability, consumers’ informa-
tion etc. Given the complexity of most products it is rare that any two products are
consumption within EU-15 averaged 98 kg per capita in 2003. While the consumption in Sweden is
among the lowest in the EU it nevertheless amounts to approximately 80 kg per capita. (Abando and
Palou, 2006).
6 For example, the proportion of hogs in operations with more than 5,000 hogs increased from 21%
to 53 % between 1994 and 2004 (USDA, 1995/96-2004/05).
14perfect substitutes, i.e. that consumers are indifferent between two goods. Includ-
ing all potential characteristics of a good would give a more complete description
of the good but would make it virtually impossible to analyze issues of industrial
organization. Hence, in trying to understand how markets work, theoretical as well
as empirical research focus on a subset of these characteristics in combination with
some speciﬁc characterization of consumer preferences.7
Traditionally, the literature on product differentiation has adopted two different
approaches to consumer preferences, the non-address approach and the address ap-
proach. In the non-address approach it is assumed that consumers gain utility from
consuming a variety of products and hence, they buy a variety of brands (see e.g.,
Chamberlin, 1933). In the address approach, on the other hand, consumers buy only
one brand but consumers have heterogenous tastes and hence, differ in their most
preferred choice, i.e. they have different ”locations” in the preference space. The
following presentation is restricted to the address approach which is also referred to
as spatial or location differentiation models.
The basic version of a location model is the ”linear city” model introduced by
Hotelling (1929).8 Two ﬁrms selling homogenous goods — in all but the geograph-
ical aspect — are located at the opposite ends of a straight road. This situation is
depicted in Figure 1 where consumers are located along the same road at different
addresses between firm a and firm b.9 Hence, if ﬁrms charge the same price, con-
sumers differ in their most preferred choice as to which ﬁrm to buy from, such that
consumers living closer to firm a will buy from firm a while consumers living
closer firm b will prefer to buy from firm b. The products are then horizontally
differentiated. Examples of horizontally differentiated goods are for example yo-
ghurt and bread. One consumer may prefer ﬂavored over natural yoghurt and dark
bread over white bread while another consumer may prefer natural over ﬂavored
yoghurt and white bread over dark bread.
Location of Location of
ﬁrm ﬁrm
a b
Road
| {z } | {z }
Location of consumers Location of consumers
in the case of in the case of
Horizontal product differentiation Vertical product differentiation
Figure 1: The "linear city" model - Horizontal and Vertical product differentiation
Vertical product differentiation, as opposed to horizontal product differentia-
tion, implies that consumers rank different goods in the same order, i.e. the good
7 For a more comprehensive review of product differentiation the reader is referred to for example
Eaton and Lipsey (1989), and Beath and Katsoulacos (1991).
8 Salop (1979) later developed this model and introduced the notion of the ”circular city”.
9 Consumers differ either in tastes or in incomes.
15preferred over another good by one consumer is also preferred by all other con-
sumers, if the goods are offered at the same price (see e.g., Mussa and Rosen, 1978;
Gabszewics and Thisse, 1979; Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 1983). Examples of such
goods are grain with different protein content, (usually) ﬁllet compared to cutlet,
meat controlled compared to meat not controlled for salmonella, etc.
Referring again to Figure 1, this implies that consumers instead of being dis-
tributed between firm a and firm b are distributed to the right of ﬁrm firm b.10
Consequently, all consumers would prefer to buy from firm b rather than from
firm a. This does not, however, necessarily mean that all consumers will buy from
firm b as the price at the different locations will differ, or firm a will go out of
business, and consumers, although they rank the goods in the same order, differ in
their location.11
Whileverysimpliﬁed, thismodelhelpsusgaininsightastothebehaviorofﬁrms
and how markets work. The geographical aspect of the ”linear city” model is some-
times relevant but can more generally be thought of as a visualization of some one
dimensional quality space. Instead of geographical locations, think of Figure 1 as a
display of different levels of quality. Then the products of the ﬁrms are ”located” at
different places in the quality space rather than the ﬁrms themselves being located
at different geographical locations. Similarly, consumers differ in their taste rather
than in their geographic location, i.e. they have different ”locations” in the quality
space. If the products are offered at the same price, and the preferred choice dif-
fers between different consumers, then the products are horizontally differentiated
while, if consumers agree on the ranking of the products, the goods are vertically
differentiated.
The country of origin labelling discussed in article I can be viewed as an attempt
to bundle a complex set of characteristics into a one-dimensional quality space. At
the time of the study 85-90% of Swedish consumers found the labelling of country
of origin helpful in evaluating meat quality/safety (as shown in the article). This
indicates that consumers tended to agree on in what order to rank ”Swedish” versus
imported meat products, i.e. these products are vertically differentiated in some
respect. The notion of vertical product differentiation is also adopted in the more
theoretically oriented papers, namely, article II and article III.
2.2 Quality from a Consumer Perspective
At the point of purchase, consumers need indicators or cues to be able to evaluate a
product. These quality cues can be either intrinsic, i.e cues that are a physical part
of the product (such as e.g. color or marbling), or extrinsic, i.e cues that are not a
10 Vertical product differentiation implies that consumers are distributed either to the left of firm a,
in which case all consumers would prefer to buy from firm a, or to the right of firm b, in which case
all consumers would prefer to buy from firm b. Only the latter case is depicted in the ﬁgure.
11 In many cases the distinction is less clear cut as products may be both horizontally and vertically
differentiated. While most consumers would probably rank a BMW or a Mercedes higher than a Skoda
or a Lada, in the choice between BMW and Mercedes some consumers would prefer a Mercedes while
others would prefer a BMW. If this is the case, BMW and Lada are vertically differentiated while BMW
and Mercedes are horizontally differentiated.
16part of but related to the physical product (such as country of origin or brand name).
From a consumer perspective quality can be divided into either search, experience,
or credence characteristics (Nelson, 1970; Darby and Karni, 1973). Search charac-
teristicsimplythattheconsumercanevaluatetheproductpriortopurchasewhileex-
perience characteristics can only be evaluated after consuming (or ”experiencing”)
the product, i.e. after buying the product. Credence characteristics, however, can
not be evaluated by the individual buyer. Consequently, the consumer has to rely
on some second or third party to provide the information, hence the label credence
characteristics. Examples of credence characteristics in the food industry are pro-
cess standards relating to animal welfare or environmental attributes and long-term
health hazards.12 While search characteristics can be readily divided into intrinsic
andextrinsic cues, experienceand credence characteristicshaveto belinkedto some
cue such as, a brand name, a quality assurance scheme, or labelling of country of
origin. (Andersson, 1994; Steenkamp, 1989)
Different characteristics may be incorporated into quality assurance schemes.
When such schemes are labelled towards the end user they are intended to assure the
consumer that the product contains certain characteristics. Thus, quality assurance
schemes can be used to communicate credence characteristics that are not otherwise
detectable to the individual consumer. They can also be used are to communicate a
bundle of characteristics of which some may be search or experience characteristics
- which consumers could ﬁnd out by themselves but at a potentially high cost - and
some may be credence characteristics. Consumers link the quality cues perceived as
important to an expected level of food quality/safety. What quality cues a consumer
perceives as important depends on preferences, socio-economic factors, previous
experience, attitudes, etc. This is the scope of the article I.
2.3 Game Theory and Vertical Product Differentiation
The agribusiness sector is characterized by a high degree of concentration in many
markets (see e.g., Sexton, 2000; Sexton and Lavoie, 2001; Buccirossi et al., 2002).
Thus, in order to capture strategic interaction between competing ﬁrms it seems
appropriate to use game theory when analyzing quality policy in these markets.
Game theoretic models concerning vertical product differentiation can be set up in
several different ways depending on the focus of interest. In this section, I will
brieﬂy discuss some important aspects of this literature that may be crucial for the
solution of the game.
The cost function assumed is essential for the outcome of a strategic game. In
the literature on vertical product differentiation cost a distinction is made between
ﬁxed and variable costs that differ somewhat from the traditional interpretation of
these concepts. Fixed costs generally refer to positive and convex costs of quality,
usually quadratic, with zero marginal and average costs of producing one unit of a
given quality. While the costs are increasing in the level of quality produced, costs
are independent of the quantity produced of any given level of quality. Variable
costs, on the other hand, generally refer to positive and convex costs of quality with
12 Generally, it can be argued that most process standards in the food industry include credence char-
acteristics.
17constant marginal and average costs of producing one unit of a given quality. In
article II as well as in article III, the cost of quality is not restricted to the variants
traditionally used in the literature on vertical product differentiation but also include
the case of decreasing returns to scale.
The existence of a high-quality advantage in endogenous quality models with
vertical product differentiation has been well-established in the literature. This im-
plies that a ﬁrm producing a higher quality will earn a higher rent than a competitor
producing a lower quality. In a duopoly setting with Bertrand competition, Aoki
and Prusa (1996) compared the outcomes of a sequential and a simultaneous moves
game. Assuming a ﬁxed cost of quality, zero marginal costs, and identical ﬁrms they
found that the ﬁrm producing the high quality would earn a larger proﬁt than the
ﬁrm producing the low quality in both simultaneous and sequential games. Given
Bertrand competition in a duopoly setting Lehmann-Grube (1997) has shown that
for all convex ﬁxed cost functions of quality, the ﬁrm that chooses the high qual-
ity earns higher proﬁts, in simultaneous as well as sequential moves games. Motta
(1993) showed that the high-quality ﬁrm has an advantage in a simultaneous two-
stage game in Bertrand as well as in Cournot competition. He examined the case
of ﬁxed as well as variable costs (given constant returns to scale) of quality. Wang
(2003) has later showed that there are circumstances in which the high-quality ad-
vantage does not exist if the unit variable cost of production is dependent on quality.
No general conditions for such circumstances are derived but he argues that there
may be a high-quality disadvantage either if the unit variable cost of production rises
quickly with quality or if the distribution of consumers is skewed towards the low
end of the quality spectrum.13
Each individual ﬁrm can be assumed to make one or more choices. In a three-
stage game, ﬁrms ﬁrst choose whether to enter the market or not, then in a second
stage what qualities to produce and then they compete in either prices or quantities.
If the decision whether to enter or not is not considered, the game reduces to a
two-stage game. As pointed out by Lehmann-Grube (1997), a two-stage game is
appropriate when ﬁrms incur a substantial ﬁxed cost of quality. In a one-stage game,
what qualities to produce and what price to charge or what quantity to produce
is decided simultaneously. In the absence of ﬁxed costs, it generally seems more
appropriate to assume a one-stage game rather than a two-stage game. In article
II, both ﬁxed and variable costs are analyzed and a two-stage game is adopted. In
article III on the other hand, no ﬁxed costs are assume and a one-stage game, where
the agents simultaneously choose what quality and what quantities to produce, is
adopted.
Whether agents act sequentially or simultaneously is another aspect that may
substantially affect the outcome of the game.14 Which approach that is reasonable
will depend on the problem at hand. A sequential game may be more appropri-
13 Motta (1993) assumes a uniform distribution of consumers, as is common in the literature, and
examines unit variable costs quadratic in the level of quality.
14 Aoki and Prusa (1996), for example, in examining the timing of investments and the level of quality
in a Bertrand setting with a ﬁxed cost of quality, found that when agents make their choices sequentially
rather than simultaneously, this results in lower investments, higher proﬁts, and lower consumer surplus
as well as reduced social welfare.
18ate e.g., when new technologies are introduced and the know-how differs between
ﬁrms, or when entry deterrence is the focus of interest. A simultaneous moves game
may be more appropriate for example when ﬁrms respond to signiﬁcant changes in
consumer demand due to food scares or as a response to threats of governmental
regulations. Firms may also be assumed to move simultaneously if new technolo-
gies become available and there is no difference in the know-how among ﬁrms. In
both article II and article III it is assumed that ﬁrms move simultaneously.
In models of vertical product differentiation consumers are generally assumed
to differ in either income or in tastes. The demand structure adopted in both arti-
cle II and article III is a simpliﬁed version of the demand structure as presented in
Mussa and Rosen (1978) where consumers differ in tastes rather than in income.
Similar demand structures have been used in e.g. Metrick and Zeckhauser (1999);
Motta (1993); Wang (2003); Wauthy (1996). Markets may be either partially or
fully covered. Assuming full market coverage, i.e. that all consumers buy the good
in question, seems as a very strong condition. As pointed out by Motta (1993), as-
suming that the market is fully covered makes it impossible to invert the demand
functions which is necessary if one is interested in examining Cournot competition.
Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983) were the ﬁrst to provide sufﬁcient conditions for
partial market coverage. Wauthy (1996) subsequently showed that the distribution
of consumer and endogenous quality choice determine whether the market is par-
tially or fully covered. Full market coverage is not assumed in neither article II nor
in article III.
3 Article I - ”Swedish” as a Quality Cue
As discussed in the introduction, the globalization of the food market implies that
the role of national regulatory policy is circumscribed as it becomes more difﬁcult
to restrict imports from other countries. However, features speciﬁc for production
from a certain country can be communicated to consumers by labelling products
with country of origin. Article I examines country of origin as a quality cue in the
Swedish market for fresh meat.
3.1 Quality Policy in the Swedish Meat Marketing Chain
The time following the Swedish application for EU-membership, Swedish or the
”Swedish model” was heavily promoted by producers and media as well as by
politicians.15 Media to a substantial degree focused on the shortcomings in the meat
production standards in other EU member countries, politicians fought for what was
perceived to be the essence of the Swedish model and producers marketed Swedish
products as qualitatively superior. The key features of the ”Swedish model” are a
stronger emphasis on animal welfare considerations than in EU in general, a prohi-
bition of using antibiotics in the feed in preventive purpose and a unique salmonella
control program (Hoffmann and Andersson, 1997).
15See Ekman and Ekman (1995) for a review of the debate in the Swedish media prior to 1995.
19As discussed in the introduction, membership in the EU implies that the role
of national governmental regulations is circumscribed.16 Since Sweden applied for
membership in the EU, the industry has on a voluntary basis assumed responsibil-
ity for some of the regulations previously in place that could be considered trade
barriers for other EU-countries. Examples of such are the now voluntary import
restrictions on breeding material.(Hoffmann and Andersson, 1997) These were kept
by the industry to preserve the good health status of the breeding stock and are
presumably perceived as cost efﬁcient by the industry. In contrast, national regula-
tions that increase the cost of domestic production relative to other countries may
reduce the competitiveness of the domestic industry. If the Swedish regulatory re-
quirements are cost enhancing, the effect of such regulations will be either limited
or may even prove counteractive, in the sense that domestic production may be re-
placed by imported goods not comprising any of the Swedish regulations, unless
the speciﬁc characteristics of Swedish produce can be effectively communicated to
consumers and that consumers are willing to pay a price premium for domestically
produced goods covering the additional production cost.
In the late 1990’s, a consumer survey conducted in six European countries (Ger-
many, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK) revealed that Swedish consumers
perceived country of origin as more important than consumers in other countries in
evaluating the quality and safety of fresh meat (Becker et al., 1998). The promotion
of the ”Swedish model” and the ﬁnding that consumers in Sweden seemed to rank
country of origin higher than consumers in several other countries within the EU
was the background to article I.
3.2 Contribution and Conclusions of Article I
The objectives of article I are to examine what factors contribute to whether con-
sumers use country of origin when evaluating fresh meat in the store, to analyze
the differences between country of origin as a quality cue for eating quality and
for food safety, and to analyze the differences between the meats beef, pork and
chicken. Country of origin is in the study assumed to refer to Sweden.
The contributions of article I are of empirical nature. This study is, to the best
of my knowledge, the ﬁrst that examines country of origin as a quality cue in the
Swedish market for fresh meat. Previous literature examining the role of country of
origin for consumers in other countries has to a large degree focused on the safety
aspect of meat. Based on a conjoint analysis Grunert (1997) found that country
of origin, as well as other extrinsic cues, had practically no effect on the forma-
tion of quality expectations of beef in France, Germany, Spain and the U.K. The
country of origin information offered to consumers did, however, not correspond to
respondents country of origin in this study. Alfnes (2004) in a stated choice exper-
iment found support that country of origin (COO) matter to Norwegian consumers
pertaining to beef.
The analysis is based on a multinomial logit model with socio-economic fac-
tors, level of education, information, trust, attitudes concerning meat and price, and
16 See especially Articles 28-30 of the EC Treaty.
20attitudes concerning the ”Swedish model” as explanatory variables. Given the leg-
islation at the time of the study and given how Swedish meat was promoted in the
mid 1990’s, attitudes towards the importance of animal welfare, concerns about
salmonella and concerns about antibiotics were considered as indicators of the atti-
tudes towards the ”Swedish model”.
Two different models were estimated. In the ﬁrst model, the probability that
consumers ﬁnd country of origin to be an important quality cue in predicting the
eating quality was estimated. Consumers’ perceived ability to visually inspect the
quality in the shop was expected to be negatively correlated with the dependent vari-
able but was in fact, surprisingly, not found to be statistically signiﬁcant. This may
be interpreted as an indication that consumers perceive intrinsic quality cues, such
as animal welfare aspects, being important for the ”Swedish model”. In the second
model, the probability that consumers ﬁnd country of origin to be an important qual-
ity cue for food safety was estimated. The two models were estimated for each of
the meats pork, beef and chicken. The results indicate that women and consumers
with low income tend to rely more on country of origin compared to men and con-
sumers with high income. In addition, consumers who valued the indicators of the
”Swedish model” were, as expected, found to be more likely to perceive country of
origin as important.
4 Article II - Quality and Ownership Structure
As discussed in the introduction, agricultural marketing cooperatives with a sub-
stantial market share can be found in many agricultural markets. These coopera-
tives often compete with investor-owned ﬁrms. Given the increased emphasis on
quality policy in food production article II examines the outcome of a game theo-
retic duopoly model with vertical product differentiation where ﬁrms may be either
cooperatives or investor-owned ﬁrms.
4.1 Vertical integration and Cooperatives
Agricultural cooperatives are owned by the farmers that are members and, hence,
should act in the best interest of these farmers. An agricultural marketing cooper-
ative (COOP) can be viewed as a ﬁrm at secondary level vertically integrated with
the primary level (see e.g., Sexton, 1986; Tennbakk, 1995). The cooperative then
maximizes the joint proﬁts of the cooperative and the individual members/farmers
combined. In the cooperative literature, several alternative objectives of a marketing
cooperative have been suggested. Besides maximizing joint proﬁts the cooperatives
could for example maximize proﬁts, producer average (per unit) return, member-
ship or output subject to a no loss constraint, and dividend per unit of input (see
e.g., LeVay, 1983).17
17 In article II it is assumed that the cooperative have a ﬁxed number of members as in Tennbakk
(1995). This assumption is adopted as the focus of interest is the strategic behavior of the processing
ﬁrms and the market outcome rather than the distribution between members and the cooperative. In a
different setting the choice whether to join a cooperative or not is discussed in for example Karantininis
and Zago (2001); Fulton and Giannakas (2001).
21The approach taken in article II is to view cooperatives as vertically integrated
between the primary and secondary level of the marketing chain and to assume
that the cooperative maximizes the joint proﬁts of the cooperative and the mem-
bers/farmers supplying the raw material. This approach is the approach taken in
e.g., Fulton (1989) and Tennbakk (1995). While article III, rather than discussing
cooperatives explicitly, views ﬁrms as either vertically integrated or vertically sep-
arated, this terminology is, with the approach taken in article II, applicable to a
discussion of cooperatives versus investor-owned ﬁrms.
Game theoretic literature pertaining to vertical product differentiation that in-
cludes the aspect of vertically integrated cooperatives is limited. Assuming a ﬁxed
cost, Economides (1999) examined the outcomes of a vertically integrated monop-
olist with two vertically separated monopolists. He found that integration generated
a higher quality at a lower price, resulting in a larger market share, larger consumer
surplus as well as proﬁts. Assuming a variable cost of quality Lambertini (1997)
compared a proﬁt-maximizing monopolist with a labor-managed monopolist and
found that while producing the same quality the latter supplied a signiﬁcantly lower
quality at a lower price.
4.2 Contributions and Conclusions of Article II
Article II examines how ownership structure affects endogenous quality choice and
the subsequent equilibrium outcomes. Investor-owned ﬁrms (IOFs) and producer
cooperatives (COOPs) are analyzed within a duopoly framework including a pri-
mary and a secondary level. The ﬁrms play a two-stage game. First they simulta-
neously choose what level of quality to produce and then they compete in prices.
Constant as well as decreasing returns to scale are examined. Speciﬁcally, the ob-
jectives of this article are to identify under what circumstances ownership structure
matters in endogenous quality models, to compare the equilibrium outcomes (qual-
ities, prices, quantities, welfare) of markets with different structure, and to discuss
the policy implications for the food industry.
Thisarticlecontributestotheexistingliteraturepertainingtoendogenousquality
models in that (i) the analysis includes two stages of the marketing chain and allows
for vertically integrated ﬁrms, (ii) ﬁrms are not assumed to have identical structure
but rather they can be either vertically separated or vertically integrated, (iii) the
analysis incorporates the case of decreasing returns to scale. In table 2, article II and
some of the previous literature on vertical product differentiation is characterized
along some important dividing lines.
In article II it is shown that if the cost of quality at primary level is ﬁxed, and/or
variable exhibiting non-constant returns to scale, ﬁrms can have a structural cost ad-
vantage due to ownership structure in addition to the high-quality advantage iden-
tiﬁed in the previous literature. In the case of a ﬁxed cost of quality at primary
level, it is shown that although IOFs charge higher prices they generate a larger
consumer surplus than COOPs by marketing higher qualities. Furthermore, cooper-
atives generate a larger producer surplus while the market share of the high-quality
good is independent of ownership structure. In the case of a variable cost of quality
22Table 2: Literature on Vertical Product Differentiation
COOPs/ Non- Cost structureb
Vertical identical Fix Variable
integration ﬁrmsa CRS DRS
Article III x x - x x
Amacher et al. (2005) - - x x -
Aoki and Prusa (1996) - - x - -
Bonnano and Haworth (1998) - - - x -
Donnenfeld and Weber (1995) - - c) - -
Economides (1999) x - x - -
Lehmann-Grube (1997) - - x - -
Metrick and Zeckhauser (1999) - - - - -
Motta (1993) - - x x -
Peitz (2002) - - d) - -
Ronnen (1991) - - x x -
Shaked and Sutton (1983) - - - x -
Ueng (1997) - h) - x -
Wang (2003) - - - x -
a Firms are considered to be identical if they incur the same cost producing the same quantity of a speciﬁc quality.
b Where none of the alternatives are marked, quality is assumed costless to produce. CRS and DRS are abbreviations
for constant and decreasing returns to scale, respectively.
c Donnenfeld and Weber (1995) assumes a ﬁxed cost for
entrants but sunk cost for the incumbent ﬁrms.
d) Fixed cost independent of quality.
h) Firms differ in costs.
at primary level, a cooperative ﬁrm possesses a structural cost advantage which is
used to market larger quantities of higher levels of quality generating larger proﬁts,
larger consumer surplus and higher social welfare. Policy implications of the differ-
ent structures are discussed. As shown in table 3 the ownership structure preferable
fromapolicyperspectivewillvarydependingonthepolicygoalspeciﬁedandonthe
cost structure. Notable is that cooperatives for many potential policy goals represent
the more beneﬁcial ownership structure.
Table 3: Most beneﬁcial ownership structure given some potential objectives
Most beneﬁcial ownership structure
Policy goal: if the farm level cost of quality is
To obtain maximum primarily ﬁxed primarily variable
Consumer surplus Investor-owned Cooperative
Producer surplus Cooperative Mixed market∗
Total welfare Inconclusive Cooperative
Market share of high-quality good Independent Cooperatives
Level of high-quality good Investor-owned Cooperative
Market coverage Mixed market∗ Cooperative
∗ Mixed market refers to a market consisting of both cooperatives and investor-owned ﬁrms.
235 Article III - Quality and Multi-product Firms
ArticleIIIexaminestheoutcomeofamulti-productgametheoreticoligopolymodel.
Firms may be either vertically separated or vertically integrated. Speciﬁcally, the is-
sues of specialization versus head-to-head competition (i.e. ﬁrms choose to produce
the same qualities as its competitors), symmetric versus asymmetric equilibria and
the existence of holes in the product line, i.e. ﬁrms may choose not to produce all
varieties, are examined.
5.1 Multi-product ﬁrms
A ﬁrm usually has to make a trade-off between on the one hand attracting as many
consumers as possible by offering a wide variety of products and on the other hand
to minimize costs by specializing. A natural effect of this strategic decision, be-
tween the ”completeness” of the product line and the cost efﬁciency, is that ”holes”
are usually left in the product line, i.e. not all possible qualities are produced. This
may be due to a ﬁxed cost per variety produced but even in the absence of such ﬁxed
costs it is costly for ﬁrms to produce ”too many” varieties. The reason for this is
that although introducing a close substitute to already existing varieties may attract
new consumers it will almost surely attract consumers previously buying an already
existing quality. Hence, if a ﬁrm markets a new variety similar to a variety it already
produces, the ﬁrm in a sense competes with itself. As a very simple illustrative
example consider the dairy industry and speciﬁcally the market for milk. Although
the number of varieties has increased in recent years there could potentially be many
more varieties of milk with different fat content.
The literature on vertical product differentiation initially developed along two
different routes. One line of research has assumed a monopolist offering multiple
qualities (see e.g., Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Gabszewics et al., 1986; Besanko et al.,
1987, 1988) while another has assumed an oligopoly where each ﬁrm supplies only
one quality (see e.g., Gabszewics and Thisse, 1979; Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 1983;
Motta, 1993).18
Champasur and Rochet (1989) examined the optimal quality-price choice in a
duopoly multi-product setting. They emphasize that on the one hand a wide product
line is required to discriminate among heterogenous consumers while on the other
hand price competition is relaxed the more differentiated the products of one ﬁrm
is from the products of its competitor thus creating an incentive for each ﬁrm to
differentiate its products from its competitors. They conclude that there is always a
gap between the ﬁrms’ product lines as the latter effect dominates. It is the assump-
tion of price competition among homogenous products that rule out head-to-head
competition. In the model of Champasur and Rochet (1989) it is always in a ﬁrm’s
interest to ﬁll any holes in the product line, at least if the competing ﬁrm is not
already offering that particular quality. Klemperer (1992) and Gilbert and Matutes
(1993) in a Bertrand setting assumes a degree of product differentiation such that
18 See Manez and Waterson (2001) for a review of multi-product ﬁrms and horizontal as well as
vertical product differentiation.
24each ﬁrm can make a positive proﬁt even when selling qualities supplied by a com-
petitor. Gilbert and Matutes (1993) shows that while ﬁrms may want to specialize
they may be trapped in a prisoners’ dilemma where the only non-cooperative solu-
tion is head-to-head competition.
De Fraja (1996) examines the optimal quality-quantity choice in an oligopoly
setting. Firms are assumed to compete in quantities rather than prices as Cournot
competition between homogenous goods is often used to approximate situations
characterized by oligopolistic competition less severe than price competition with
perfect substitutes. Furthermore, in some industries a lag exists between production
and sales, and hence prices are often used to clear the market given a ﬁxed volume
to sell.19 Assuming a variable cost and constant returns to scale he ﬁnds that the
equilibriumwillbesymmetric, i.e. thateachﬁrmproducesthesamequantitiesofthe
same qualities. Hence, ﬁrms choose head-to-head competition over specialization.
Furthermore, he shows that while the highest quality is always produced there may
be holes left in the product line.
5.2 Contributions and Conclusions of Article III
Article III examines multi-product ﬁrms within an oligopoly framework allowing
for vertical integration between the primary and the secondary level of the market-
ing chain. Firms play a one-stage game where they simultaneously choose what
qualities to produce and compete in quantities. Constant as well as decreasing re-
turns to scale are examined. The objectives of article III are to examine under what
circumstances the equilibrium is symmetric/asymmetric, when ﬁrms choose to spe-
cialize and when they choose head-to-head competition, under what circumstances
holes are left in the product line, and how the equilibrium outcome in a duopoly is
affected by the entry of new ﬁrms.
Article III is an extension of the article by De Fraja (1996). It contributes to
the existing literature concerning vertical product differentiation and multi-product
ﬁrms in that; (i) the analysis include two stages of the marketing chain, (ii) ﬁrms are
allowed to be either vertically integrated or vertically separated, (iii) ﬁrms are not
a priori assumed to have identical structure, (iv) the analysis incorporates the case
of decreasing returns to scale in addition to the case of constant returns and hence
goes beyond the traditional concept of ”variable costs” as deﬁned in the literature
on vertical product differentiation.20 In table 4, article III along with some of the
previous literature on multi-product ﬁrms and vertical product differentiation are
characterized along some important dividing lines.
The conditions for symmetric and asymmetric equilibria are identiﬁed and dis-
cussed. It is shown that head-to-head competition rather than specialization is a
common outcome. Furthermore, it is shown that holes may be left in the product
line although the highest quality is always produced. These ﬁndings are not re-
19 De Fraja (1996) also points out that in the homogenous good case, Bertrand competition would rule
out head-to-head competition.
20 In the literature on vertical product differentiation ”variable costs” traditionally refers to constant
variable and marginal costs as discussed in section 2.3.
25Table 4: Literature on Vertical Product Differentiation and multi-product ﬁrms
Vertically Non- Cost structureb)
integrated identical Fix Variable
ﬁrms ﬁrmsa) CRS DRS
Article III x x - x x
Besanko et al. (1988) x - - x -
Champasur and Rochet (1989) - - - x -
De Fraja (1996)c) x - - x -
Gabszewics et al. (1986) - - - -
Gilbert and Matutes (1993) - - - - -
Lambertini (1997) xd) - x x -
Mussa and Rosen (1978) - - x - -
a) Firms are considered to be identical if they incur the same cost producing the same quantity of a speciﬁc quality.
b) Where none of the alternatives are marked, quality is assumed costless to produce. CRS and DRS are abbreviations
for constant and decreasing returns to scale, respectively.
c) De Fraja (1996) also mentions a ﬁxed cost not dependent
on the quality produced.
d) Labor managed monopolist maximizing the value added per worker.
stricted to the case of constant returns to scale. Furthermore, the effects of entry by
new ﬁrms are discussed. Some of the results are summarized in table 5.
Table 5: Some of the key results emanating from article III
Type of technology at primary level
CRS DRS
Firms have - symmetric equilibrium - symmetric equilibrium
the same structure - non-specialization - non-specialization
- potentially - potentially
”incomplete” product line ”incomplete” product line
Firms have - symmetric equilibrium - asymmetric equilibrium
different structures - non-specialization - non-specialization
- potentially - potentially
”incomplete” product line ”incomplete” product line
6 Article IV - Asset Fixity in Hog Production
The U.S. hog production sector has undergone a dramatic structural change, from
small to large scale operations, during the past decade (USDA, 1995/96-2004/05).
The advent of new production technologies, increased access to international mar-
kets, and improved access to ﬁnancial capital through various forms of vertical ar-
rangements are a few of the factors that have contributed to this structural change.
The transformation into larger scale operations have required greater amounts and
more specialized types of capital, such as larger and more custom-designed housing
26facilities, specialized types of machinery, and investments in manure management.
Such inputs are typically referred to as quasi-ﬁxed inputs because, while changes in
the capital stock are feasible, there are costs associated with such an adjustment.
6.1 Investment under Uncertainty
Classical investment theory typically assumes a convex adjustment cost function
dictating a smooth adjustment in the stock of quasi-ﬁxed inputs. Investments and
disinvestments are made whenever the market conditions change in order to main-
tain the equality between the shadow value of capital and the marginal adjustment
costs. Investment rigidities may, however, be present given irregularities in the ad-
justment cost function. If this is the case, producers may maintain the same level
of quasi-ﬁxed inputs, consequently not adjusting their production, even though the
economic situation changes.
The existence of such rigidity in the adjustment of quasi-ﬁxed input, here re-
ferred to as asset ﬁxity21, is a long-standing issue in the agricultural economic liter-
ature (see e.g., Edwards, 1959; Vasavada and Chambers, 1986; Nelson et al., 1989).
Several reasons for this phenomenon have been suggested and unifying the literature
Abel and Eberly (1994) propose an ”augmented adjustment cost function”. They al-
low for price asymmetry, as suggested by Johnson (1956), and non-differentiability,
as suggested by Hsu and Chang (1990), and show that although capital investment
is a non-decreasing function of the asset’s shadow price, it is not responsive to price
changes if the shadow value falls within a range of inaction. The range of inaction
is deﬁned by an upper and a lower threshold and the magnitude of these thresholds
are determined by the characteristics of the augmented adjustment cost function.
Given that the adjustment in capital may be characterized by a range of inac-
tion, it is important that this aspect taken into account when modelling producers’
demandforquasi-ﬁxedinputandoutputsupplyinordertobetterunderstandagricul-
tural markets. The importance of accounting for asset ﬁxity is further emphasized
by noting that rigidities may work as entry barriers, as pointed out by Pietola and
Myers (2000), and that asset ﬁxity at the farm level may be aggravated in the pres-
ence of other frictions along the supply chain, as pointed out by Boetel et al. (2004).
6.2 Contribution and Conclusions of Article IV
The objective of article IV is to estimate aggregate U.S. hog supply explicitly ac-
counting for the implications of possible asset ﬁxity in the employment of quasi-
ﬁxed inputs. Speciﬁcally, it addresses the issues of investment asymmetry and the
possible existence of an inaction or sluggish regime in the demand for quasi-ﬁxed
input in the U.S. hog production sector. Drawing on the theoretical work of Abel
and Eberly (1994) the empirical analysis is conducted using the threshold estima-
tion procedure developed by Hansen (1996, 1999, 2000). Quarterly data from 1970
through 2002 are used to estimate a regime-dependent investment demand equation
for quasi-ﬁxed input, using sows as a proxy.
21 Such rigidity is also referred to in the literature as investment rigidity, investment irreversibility and
investment hysteresis.
27This study contributes to the existing literature as it is the ﬁrst to examine the
threshold aspect of investment decisions of U.S. hog producers using an endoge-
nous threshold estimation procedure allowing for an inaction or sluggish regime in
addition to an investment and a disinvestment regimes. The results support the exis-
tence of a sluggish regime in addition to an investment and a disinvestment regime,
conﬁrming the existence of asset ﬁxity in sow investment. The results also highlight
the importance of accounting for investment rigidity when estimating hog supply
and variable input demands.
While not discussed in the article, the results may have implications for quality
policy. Quality assurance schemes, implying an additional cost it seems reason-
able to assume, may entail additional uncertainty concerning the productivity and
additional demand uncertainty if they are reasonably novel. On the other hand,
quality assurance schemes may make it easier for individual ﬁrms to target certain
high-quality niche markets thereby reducing uncertainty. As discussed in the intro-
duction, the trend towards more relationship-speciﬁc vertical coordination due to
the increased focus on quality, may imply that the problem of asset ﬁxity increases
over time.
7 Concluding Remarks
This thesis covers different parts of the marketing chain using several different ap-
proaches on different topics. As the conclusions of the individual articles are pre-
sented elsewhere, I will take the opportunity here to instead look ahead and sketch
some ideas for future research.
Natural extensions of the more theoretical articles II and III would be to empiri-
cally test some of the hypotheses suggested by the results found. A general problem
arising in doing so is the difﬁculty of empirically measuring quality. Most food
products marketed towards consumers are either fairly homogenous, such as ﬂour
for example, or very complex, such as meats entailing multiple credence, experience
and search characteristics. If the problem of measuring quality can be overcome by
creating some kind of quality-index, one of the hypotheses from article II that would
be interesting to test empirically is whether cooperatives do produce higher quality
than investor-owned ﬁrms given decreasing returns to scale. An interesting con-
clusion made in article III that would be interesting to examine empirically is that
processing ﬁrms tend to choose to compete head-to-head rather than to specialize,
even in the presence of differences in cost structure due to different organizational
structure. Another conclusion of article III that could be empirically tested is that,
in an oligopoly setting, vertically separated ﬁrms will produce product lines which
are at least as broad as the product lines of vertically integrated ﬁrms.
A more theoretical expansion of the duopoly model in article II would be to
extend the model into an oligopoly framework with multiple ﬁrms having the possi-
bility to adjust what qualities to produce at a surmountable cost in a repeated game.
Such a dynamic game would be reasonable only if the investment cost associated
with quality is not substantial. That changing the quality of the produce supplied
28would be achievable at a fairly low cost may be argued to be more likely when
some kind of quality assurance scheme is already in place. Even if a quality as-
surance scheme is already in place it would, however, probably not be reasonable
to assume a low adjustment cost in the meat production if quality aspects involve
quality-speciﬁc housing system due to animal welfare concerns.
AnotherinterestingtheoreticalextensionofarticlesIIandIIIwouldbetoexpand
the models, taking horizontal as well as vertical product differentiation into account.
However, one drawback of game theory is that once you go beyond fairly simplistic
models, the complexity quickly increases. That is for example the reason why so
many game theoretic models pertaining to vertical product differentiation consider
a very basic cost structure and assume a uniform distribution of consumers.
Article IV focuses on investment under uncertainty and the problem of asset
ﬁxity. While the application refers to the U.S. hog market, this problem is likely
to be present in other agricultural markets as well. As pointed out in the article,
the problem of asset ﬁxity in the primary production may be worsened if there exist
capacityconstraintsindown-streamprocessingﬁrms. Hence, itwouldbeinteresting
to extend the analysis to incorporate subsequent stages of the marketing chain. It
would also be interesting to apply the endogenous threshold model to the Swedish
market and examine the investment behavior of Swedish hog producers, especially
so in the case of new and evolving animal welfare standards.
Asthisthesisisusingdifferentapproachesandcoversdiverseaspectsofthefood
marketing chain there are many more potential areas for future research that relate
to the presented articles in one way or the other. However, as the above discussion
indicates, the areas I ﬁnd most interesting to investigate further are (i) to extend the
game theoretic models so that they more closely relate to markets found in the food
industry and, (ii) to empirically test some of the conclusions drawn from articles II
and III.
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